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ESSAY: WEIGHING THE POTENTIAL OF  
CITIZEN REDISTRICTING 
Justin Levitt* 
As they do every ten years, this year state legislatures across the 
country are redrawing legislative district lines to reflect population 
shifts and ensure equal representation for each district. In 2010, 
California voters passed a proposition granting the California Citizens 
Redistricting Commission control over the drawing of congressional 
lines. This Symposium Essay examines the potential for redistricting by 
an independent group of citizens such as the Citizens Redistricting 
Commission. First, it explores the nature of the redistricting process, a 
process often explained as fundamentally political, and argues, instead, 
that the process is both political and pre-political. This Essay then 
examines incumbent legislators’ roles in the redistricting process in 
light of this insight, and challenges the presumption that incumbents 
are more accountable to members of their districts because of 
redistricting. Finally, this Essay reviews various alternatives to 
incumbent control of the redistricting process, and both the positive and 
negative potential of citizen redistricting. 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I would like to thank Rick 
Hasen, Aziz Huq, Allan Ides, Cameron Schroeder, and the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review for enormously helpful comments and suggestions. All errors, of course, are my 
own. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Redistricting—the act of drawing and redrawing legislative 
districts as population shifts, to ensure roughly equal representation 
for each district—is once again upon the nation. In 2011, 
jurisdictions across the country will again redraw the lines that 
determine the representation they will receive. And with each new 
redistricting cycle, the debate arises anew about whether the 
procedures used are well suited to effectuate the public’s interest in 
the process. 
The 2010 California elections offered a particularly salient 
opportunity to reflect on the manner in which redistricting is 
conducted. In 2008, Californians narrowly passed Proposition 11, 
which removed the state legislature’s control over the lines of its 
members’ own districts, and delivered that control instead to a 
commission of citizens without direct ties to officials whose jobs 
depend on the way the lines are drawn.1 Two years later, two new 
propositions appeared on the general-election ballot. One measure 
granted the new citizens’ commission control over drawing 
congressional lines as well.2 The other would have eliminated the 
commission entirely.3 
This Essay takes California’s choice as inspiration to examine 
more generally the potential for redistricting by an independent 
group of citizens. In Part II, it explores the nature of the redistricting 
process. Often, this process is explained as fundamentally political, 
 
 1. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 
2008: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 70–73, 137–40 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 OFFICIAL 
VOTER GUIDE], available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov-
2008-principal.pdf; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL 
ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/ 
sov_complete.pdf (providing votes for and against state ballot measures in California’s 2008 
general election). 
 2. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 
2010: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 18–23, 95–97 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 VOTER 
INFORMATION GUIDE], available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/pdf/english/complete-vig.pdf. 
This measure (Proposition 20) passed, by a final vote count of approximately 60 percent to 40 
percent. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: STATEMENT OF VOTE 90 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 STATEMENT OF VOTE], available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ 
sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf. 
 3. 2010 VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 2, at 62–67, 115–21. This measure 
(Proposition 27) failed, also by approximately 60 percent to 40 percent. 2010 STATEMENT OF 
VOTE, supra note 2, at 96. 
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and therefore particularly suited to execution by politicians. I argue, 
instead, that the process is both political and pre-political; it not only 
flows from, but also defines, the jurisdiction’s relevant political 
cleavages. Part III then examines incumbent legislators’ role in the 
redistricting process in light of this insight, including a normative 
assessment of skills and predilections that incumbents may bring to 
bear. Part IV follows with a brief review of various alternatives to 
incumbent control of the redistricting process, capped by a more 
thorough review of the potential—both positive and negative—for 
citizen redistricting. 
II.  THE NATURE OF THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS 
Every ten years, after the U.S. Census Bureau releases its 
demographic portrait of the country, jurisdictions throughout the 
nation reallocate political power among their constituents. In most 
jurisdictions, districts define the groups of individuals represented in 
legislative assemblies by federal, state, and local officials. By 
constitutional command, those districts must be of roughly equal 
size, preserving equality of representation.4 And so, to keep up with 
an itinerant public, jurisdictions redraw the lines of their 
representatives’ districts after every census to ensure population 
equality. 
This redistricting is commonly said to be a fundamentally 
political enterprise. It is political in the colloquial partisan sense, in 
that this is the arena in which competing Republican and Democratic 
partisans have conducted their most pitched battles, jousting with 
each other to divvy electoral turf in the most advantageous manner. 
And it is political in a more inherent sense, in that multiple complex 
tradeoffs are required among multiple goals, with no outcome that 
clearly serves all of the population equally. Those who redistrict may 
weigh raw population count, racial and ethnic representation, 
partisan composition, municipal and geographic boundaries, sprawl 
and concentration, and communities of shared interests among the 
factors determining where district lines should fall. Each factor may 
have a legitimate role in determining a district’s bounds, depending 
 
 4. See Avery v. Midland Cnty., Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 478 (1968) (discussing local 
government districts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 539 (1964) (discussing state legislative 
districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964) (discussing congressional districts). 
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on different contested conceptions about what representation should 
accomplish. Each factor will also be applied in ways yielding 
partisan or personal repercussions for incumbents seeking reelection 
from these new districts. And all of these factors cannot sensibly be 
reconciled with each other in the same way or to the same degree 
throughout the sprawl of a diverse state. Choosing which interests to 
prioritize in which locations involves a complicated negotiation 
among competing factions with plausible claims that their 
preferences best represent public welfare. 5 
From one vantage point, therefore, this process looks political in 
much the same way that all other public policy decisions are 
political. Citizens entrust representatives 6 to negotiate complicated 
and multifaceted decisions about providing and distributing a public 
good. In the redistricting context, the good in question is legislative 
representation; in other contexts, it might be public defense or health 
care or environmental protection. In this view, redistricting decisions 
are normal political outputs: translations of public preferences about 
representation, subject to all of the recurring epistemological 
quandaries and imperfections of the regular translation process. 7 
From another vantage point, however, the redistricting process 
looks “pre-political” in a way that most other public acts are not.8 
That is, redistricting decisions are not only outputs of a translation 
process but also part of the translation algorithm itself. Redistricting 
 
 5. See, e.g., Steven Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters More Accountable to the 
People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 53–54 (2010). 
 6. In most American jurisdictions, the group entrusted with this choice is defined by a 
majority of legislators (subject to executive veto), themselves chosen by pluralities of voters in 
electoral districts established during prior cycles. 
 7. See, e.g., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). 
 8. This Essay borrows the term from Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The 
Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
4 (1985). Professors Lowenstein and Steinberg, however, use the term to define common 
“principles [that] are generally accepted as constituting the ground rules of the political struggle,” 
and that have broad consensus among the governed. Id. at 75. Here, I expand the term to embrace 
ground rules that shape the nature and products of representation, even when the choice of any 
particular system is vigorously contested. For example, the choice of legislative procedures (e.g., 
a majority or supermajority requirement) or voting systems (not the machinery for recording 
votes, but rather the method of aggregating preferences, like single-member plurality voting or 
multi-member ranked-choice voting) may be among the rules that qualify as pre-political, with or 
without more general consensus. It is not necessary to claim that the categories of political and 
pre-political are mutually exclusive to recognize that acts with a pre-political quality may deserve 
distinct treatment. In a future article, I hope to further explore the nature and bounds of pre-
political acts and the implications of entrusting different institutions with such actions. 
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reorders how citizens are grouped for representational purposes. If, 
as is the case in most American jurisdictions, a bare plurality of the 
voters within a given district selects a single representative, slight 
changes in a district’s composition may generate substantial changes 
in that district’s choice of representative—and therefore in the 
interests most vigorously represented for that district.9 In the 
aggregate, changes in the district lines can result in significant shifts 
in the policy preferences of a legislative majority. Redistricting is a 
single public act with the ability to shift the terrain on which all 
future political activity is negotiated. It does so by shifting political 
power among the groups within a jurisdiction that have the capacity 
to see their preferences translated into policy. 10 Redistricting changes 
the aggregation of political preferences and the way that those 
preferences play out through the remainder of the political process, 
even when no individual constituent’s interests have changed. And as 
such, redistricting is pre-political. 
III.  THE ROLE OF EXISTING LEGISLATORS 
In the system described above, existing legislators have at best a 
conflicted role in determining where district lines are to be drawn. To 
the extent that redistricting is a political act like any other, of course, 
the default presumption is that the legislature is best equipped to 
make the necessary decisions. In this vein, we are frequently told that 
redistricting is best left to the political bodies otherwise tasked with 
resolving similarly complex public policy matters. 11 And so it is that 
most American jurisdictions allow their legislatures to control this 
fundamental process. 
 
 9. Alternatively, incumbents may shift the policies they promote, in order to reflect the 
developing composition of the districts in which they reside. In either case, a change in the 
grouping of constituents has the capacity to drive significant change in the interests primarily 
represented in the legislature. 
 10. The stakes involved in redistricting are magnified when a single legislator is chosen from 
each district; under these conditions, each incremental decision to include or exclude citizens 
when drawing the district lines may drive changes in the only representation that the district’s 
citizens receive. Conversely, when districts are larger, and used to elect multiple representatives 
using a voting system responsive to multiple constituencies within the district, the 
representational stakes of the redistricting decision decrease. 
 11. See, e.g., John Marelius, Thousands Apply for State Redistricting Panel, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 25, 2010, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/jan/25/ 
thousands-apply-redistricting-panel/. 
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To the extent that redistricting is pre-political, however, the 
process presents an intriguing conundrum. By grouping different 
voters together in different ways, redistricting resets the political 
baseline. In some ways, the redistricting process can be seen as an 
Etch-a-Sketch for politics, vigorously shaken every ten years, erasing 
the existing district map before new lines are drawn. 12 With the slate 
clean, it is not clear why legislators elected by obsolete groups of 
voters should have presumptive authority to represent the present 
public will.  
Still, some process is necessary to determine how voters will be 
grouped anew into districts. That process, in turn, must either be 
conducted or governed by rules set by an entity with representational 
legitimacy. Such an entity could be popularly elected. But if the 
redistricting entity comprises any significant number of 
representatives, the number of choices would quickly become 
overwhelming. It would be possible to narrow the selection pool by 
some mechanism—like, for example, districts. However, this would 
require an entity to draw those district lines . . . , and so on. 
Casting about for another representationally legitimate 
mechanism to draw district lines quickly leads back to the 
legislature. Even if the pre-political nature of the process deprives 
the legislature of an inherently privileged redistricting role, the 
legislature remains the most obvious existing representative 
institution to represent the public in this process. Legislators tend to 
know the areas that they represent quite well and will likely 
understand the relevant local cleavages better than most other 
citizens. If they have been in office for the decade since the last 
redrawing of the maps, they may well have expertise in the technical 
requirements of the redistricting process, which can be quite 
complex. If representational stability is its own substantive benefit, 
incumbent legislators have very natural incentives to keep their own 
existing districts’ cores intact. 13 And most important for the 
 
 12. There may well be legitimate value in preserving the bulk of a district from redistricting 
cycle to redistricting cycle, but that is a substantive value to be weighed against others (such as 
population equality, racial and ethnic representation, or partisan composition) and dependent on 
different theories about what representation should best attempt to achieve. There is no reason 
inherent to the redistricting process why it should begin from the status quo rather than from a 
clean slate. 
 13. Of course, just as each incumbent legislator has a natural incentive to preserve her own 
district, she may also have natural incentives to dismantle the districts of competitors or 
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argument above, the members of the legislature have been elected 
and thereby seem to have legitimacy to act on behalf of the public. 
Yet upon closer examination, this legitimacy has limits in the 
redistricting process that are not present in other contexts. Legislators 
are elected by members of their districts but are not accountable to 
them—at least, not to the same group of them—for their redistricting 
decisions. First, it strains credulity to believe that any legislator 
would in practice be removed from office because of the way in 
which she conducted redistricting. But more fundamentally, even if 
the public actually voted on the basis of redistricting performance, 
the public to which any legislator is ostensibly accountable for her 
redistricting decision disappears by virtue of the redistricting process. 
That is, redistricting performed by a representative on behalf of a 
particular group of constituents is necessarily an act that those 
constituents cannot review, because redistricting reshapes the 
represented group before the next election. The group of citizens 
who elect a legislator in 2020 to perform redistricting is necessarily 
different from the group that would, in 2022, evaluate that 
legislator’s redistricting performance. 14 When the question at hand is 
whether new citizen groupings have been created in the public 
interest, asking a plurality of the new citizen grouping to evaluate its 
own merit as a representative unit is an inherently problematic path 
to accountability for the process. 
Moreover, legislative control of the districting Etch-a-Sketch 
creates a uniquely robust risk of self-dealing. The placement of 
district lines—any placement of district lines—will have an impact 
on the likelihood that a given legislator is reelected. The underlying 
composition of a district is not itself destiny: candidates have won 
races in districts heavily weighted toward a different political party, 
socioeconomic status, or race. But redistricting can make a 
candidate’s path significantly easier—or significantly more difficult. 
When incumbent legislators control the redistricting process, 
their own jobs are at stake more immediately than in other legislation 
 
opponents. See Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 756 (2007) (describing the Republican targeting of the district of 
Representative Martin Frost, one of the “architects” of the previous Democratic gerrymander). 
 14. Most states will conduct redistricting in the year after the U.S. Census delivers 
population data and before the following elections (in this upcoming cycle, redistricting will 
usually occur at some point in 2011 or early 2012). NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 155 (2009) (reviewing redistricting deadlines). 
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impacting the election process. 15 That is, legislators who are placed 
in charge of trading off various competing redistricting 
considerations are also the same individuals who stand to gain the 
most, personally and directly, by including certain residents and 
excluding others—whether those residents are voters, supporters, or 
rivals. These same individuals also feel most keenly the impact of 
belonging to a legislative majority or minority and have an incentive 
to ensure, above all considerations other than the politically 
favorable composition of their own districts, that other districts are 
designed to yield maximum favorable control of the chamber. 16 
Moreover, legislative leaders have the opportunity to use the 
redistricting process to make reelection exceedingly difficult for 
other legislators, either to avenge slights or to remove potential 
opponents or competitors. It should not be surprising that legislators 
who are permitted to use that power in their self-interest often do so, 
even at the expense of that which they perceive to be in the public 
interest. 17 Districts drawn within this system are commonly shaped to 
reward or punish individual candidates and to promote partisan 
fortunes—rather than to foster the most meaningful representation, 
by any measure of that concept. 
For example, as I have elsewhere recounted: 
In 2001, . . . a federal judge described the redistricting 
process for Madison County, Illinois, as full of “threats, 
 
 15. Flexible candidates are often able to adapt campaign practices strategically to changes 
affecting campaign finance rules or election administration procedures. It is much more difficult, 
however, to adapt a campaign to a new set of voters with fundamentally different concerns or a 
fundamentally different philosophy of government. 
 16. The incentives to maximize partisan control at the expense of other considerations are 
present whether or not the party controlling the legislature reflects the statewide partisan 
preference. These incentives may be particularly alarming, however, when a statewide minority 
has achieved legislative control for the redistricting cycle. For example, in 2000, Georgians cast 
53 percent of their total state legislative votes for Republican candidates and cast 55 percent of 
their votes statewide for the Republican presidential candidate, but Democrats controlled the 
redistricting process—and the incumbents used the process substantially to further personal and 
partisan goals. See, e.g., Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325–31 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, 
542 U.S. 947 (2004); Official Results of the November 7, 2000 General Election, GA. SEC’Y OF 
STATE, http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2000_1107/summary.htm (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2011). 
 17. In most states, state legislators draw not only state legislative district lines but also the 
lines for congressional districts. JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20, 34–
36 (2010). To the extent that, based on partisan or personal ties, state legislators prioritize the 
desires of individual members of Congress over the public interest in this process, the limitations 
of legislative redistricting apply to congressional districts just as they do to state legislative 
districts. 
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coercion, bullying, and a skewed view of the law,” with the 
process “so far short of representing the electorate that it 
seems the citizens of Madison County were not so much as 
an afterthought.” Said the redistricting committee chairman 
to one of his committee colleagues: “We are going to shove 
[the map] up your f------ a-- and you are going to like it, and 
I’ll f--- any Republican I can.” 18 
With processes like these, it is perhaps little wonder that the United 
States is unique among industrialized democracies in putting an 
inherent conflict of interest directly at the heart of the redistricting 
system. 19 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES 
Scholars, advocates, and even some elected officials have 
proposed many alternatives to the standard status quo in which 
sitting incumbents redraw their own districts and those of their 
competitors, more or less as they please. 20 
A.  Automation 
One proposal that seems to attract recurring attention, 
particularly when juxtaposed with existing incumbents’ conflicts of 
 
 18. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hulme v. Madison Cnty., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 
1044, 1051 (S.D. Ill. 2001)). 
 19. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
28, 78–79 (2004). 
 20. Professor Chris Elmendorf and Professor Michael Kang have each offered extremely 
thoughtful proposals to append democracy-enhancing processes to the legislative status quo, 
rather than displacing it entirely. Elmendorf suggests an advisory body to provide anchor 
legislation, forcing the legislature to react to a default offer that is presumably more squarely in 
the public interest than the map the legislature would draw on its own, and cites evidence that 
legislatures abroad actually tend to defer to these bodies. Christopher S. Elmendorf, 
Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1385–90 (2005). Kang suggests an adjustment on the other end of the 
legislative process, holding legislative maps subject to public referendum. Michael S. Kang, De-
Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 667 (2006). Either has the potential to blunt the exercise of legislative self-interest. Yet 
given the exceedingly low salience of discrete redistricting decisions for the American general 
public, Huefner, supra note 5, at 61 & n.92, and the exceedingly high salience of discrete 
redistricting decisions for individual legislators, it is not clear how much legislative restraint 
either mechanism would generate if implemented domestically. Still, I hope to consider in future 
work a promising combination of the two ideas: offering the public a choice between the 
redistricting map of an advisory citizens’ body and the product of the familiar legislative process. 
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interest, is automation: 21 the Magical Redistricting Machine that 
draws lines, ostensibly without the messy mixed motives of human 
involvement. However, there are several reasons to believe that 
automation is less adequate in this respect than it may superficially 
appear. 
The most immediate limitation is computational capacity. Micah 
Altman has demonstrated that even if it were possible to prioritize, 
reconcile, quantify, and measure each desired input to the 
redistricting process, present computing technology might not have 
the capacity to generate an optimal redistricting “solution” for most 
jurisdictions—and certainly not for a state of California’s size and 
complexity. 22 If redistricting is designed to achieve multiple 
objectives—and most commentators believe that there are several 
worthwhile goals to be achieved in drawing any redistricting plan—it 
turns out that the calculations required to identify a single “winning” 
plan for a geography of any substantial size are so computationally 
complex that they become practically unsolvable by computers under 
common conditions. 23 
Even if the technological limitation could be solved, however, 
automation confronts a deeper philosophical problem. There is no 
“neutral” rule for drawing district lines. Each rule implies some 
vision of representation or accountability, or some precursor 
conception of the actor who should resolve conflicts among different 
visions of representation when those conflicts arise. For example, a 
rule requiring districts above all else to follow the lines of county 
boundaries presumes that it is advantageous for representational 
purposes to group citizens by their county residency. Indeed, such a 
rule presumes that it is representationally superior to group citizens 
by county than to group them by municipality or mathematical 
proximity or race or purely at random. 
 
 21. For a useful review of proposals that computers be used to conduct or facilitate 
redistricting, see generally Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of 
Computers in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69 (2010). 
 22. Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated Redistricting: Is 
Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 81 (1997). 
 23. Id. at 101. In response, some have proposed automated solutions that do not seek to 
optimize multiple objectives, but instead select at random plans that meet various threshold 
conditions. Such a solution is more computationally feasible with present technology but is still 
subject to the additional drawbacks discussed below. See Altman & McDonald, supra note 21, at 
82–83. 
  
524 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:513 
There is ample debate among scholars, activists, and 
practitioners about the role in redistricting of—alone and in 
context—the continuity of political representation, the nature of 
protection for minority rights, the degree of partisan competition or 
partisan inequity, physical proximity or accessibility, and the ability 
and desirability of representing homogenous or heterogeneous 
communities. Redistricting rules represent different approaches to 
working through that debate; some reveal more introspection than 
others. Even a hypothetical rule that subjugated all of these concerns 
to abstract mathematical principles or geometric shapes would 
embrace the non-neutral normative view that each of these concerns 
should be subjugated to the abstract mathematical principle or 
geometric shape in question because that principle or shape is 
assumed to produce representation superior to that achieved by other 
means. 
Moreover, most potential rules for drawing district lines have 
predictable political consequences that may favor a particular party 
or set of parties, or a particular candidate or set of candidates, as 
compared to some alternative rule. That is, most redistricting laws 
not only imply some vision of representation, or theory about whom 
should be entrusted to make representational decisions, but will also 
likely have a tangible impact on a particular set of actors’ electoral 
fortunes. 24 That impact neither makes the choice improper nor 
vitiates normative evaluation of the choice. It does, however, render 
suspect claims about the normative superiority of certain readily 
automated laws or principles based solely on the fact that they may 
appear facially to be apolitical. 
The desire to strive simultaneously toward multiple objectives 
complicates matters further. Local goals with respect to the 
composition of individual districts may conflict with statewide goals 
pertaining to the nature of, say, the California delegation as a whole. 
Goals for individual districts will conflict with each other as well, as 
when the desire to present voters with multiple viable options in a 
general election confronts the desire to assemble voters with similar 
interests in order to encourage representation of an identifiable 
character. Resolving these conflicts requires either prioritization or 
 
 24. See, e.g., LEVITT, supra note 17, at 55; Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding 
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 649, 677 (2002). 
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compromise, or both—or both to different degrees, in different 
portions of a map. 
As a consequence, there is no neutral way to program an 
automated machine to draw the district lines. The rules governing 
such a machine would represent very real choices about the nature of 
representation, including what factors to consider in designing 
representation and what factors to forego considering. Positing a 
redistricting machine simply moves those choices—currently 
resolved most often by incumbents in the shadow of state and federal 
legal constraints—to the stage of programming the machine. It does 
not remove the need to make the choices in the first place. 
Finally, automation poses an additional problem of 
measurability. Even if it were possible to achieve consensus on the 
multiple and interactive goals of the redistricting process, on their 
relative importance, and on the degree to which that relative 
importance might vary in different regions of a redistricting map, 
translating that consensus to a machine-operable algorithm will 
involve some noise. Some of the representational goals may be 
translated with comparative precision to standard measures; for 
example, if a goal of representation is equalizing representational 
access, it is relatively straightforward to find a uniform metric for 
measuring the number of individuals within a district, even if there is 
inevitably error in the measure. 25 But some goals (e.g., keeping 
voters who live close together in the same district) will depend on 
approximate proxies (e.g., mathematical measures of geometric 
“compactness”). And others (e.g., keeping voters with similar 
interests in the same district) will strongly resist ready quantification 
even by proxy. Some factors (e.g., determining whether a racial 
minority’s votes have, in the totality of the circumstances, been 
diluted) may have both quantifiable elements and elements that are 
exceedingly difficult to quantify. Weighting the relative priorities of 
these restrictions may also require quantifying assessments in a 
manner that entails imprecision, because relative priorities are 
necessarily imprecise. 
In addition, with a drive to quantify for purposes of automated 
processing, there will inevitably be a temptation to focus on readily 
 
 25. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH AND PLANS FOR COVERAGE 
MEASUREMENT IN THE 2010 CENSUS: INTERIM ASSESSMENT 5 (Robert Bell & Michael L. Cohen 
eds., 2007). 
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measured factors (e.g., population count) or readily evaluated 
measures of those factors (e.g., precisely equal numbers of 
individuals), to a degree that may not reflect the factors’ actual 
importance. In some circumstances, for example, it may be more 
important that districts be only approximately equal in population in 
order to ensure flexibility to achieve other important objectives. The 
drive to quantify and evaluate for the automation process will likely 
exaggerate the importance of mathematical precision even where 
such precision is unwarranted. 
In these respects, the quest to “solve” the redistricting puzzle for 
automation purposes is akin to the quest for the “best” supermarket 
produce. Analysts would want to take into account size, shelf life, 
cost, color, texture, and taste, among many other factors. Even 
assuming that it were possible to reach some agreement on the 
relative weights and priorities of these factors, there remains the 
thorny measurement issue. Size, shelf life, and cost can be easily 
measured and scored. There are quantitative scales for color, but 
normative opinions on the “best” color likely vary, and it will be 
difficult to score color blends. And while measurements for various 
component elements of taste are improving in sophistication, 26 
quantification of the whole is still approximate at best—and again, 
subject to enormous normative disagreement. If the chosen 
measurements and their relative weight are imperfect proxies for our 
actual preferences, squeezing the pursuit of the “best” supermarket 
produce into a machine-operable model may end up yielding 
something other than what we would collectively adjudge the best 
produce available. The same is true with redistricting. 
B.  Strictly Binding Rules 
As an alternative to feeding the redistricting process to a 
computer, it may seem tempting to confront incumbents’ conflicts of 
interest by binding their hands. Such a proposal would define the 
redistricting process and substantive criteria so tightly that those with 
the pen essentially fill only a ministerial function, carrying out a 
result effectively predetermined by the governing rules. In other 
 
 26. See, e.g., Andrey Legin et al., Electronic Tongue for Pharmaceutical Analytics, 380 
ANALYTICAL & BIOANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 36 (2004); U. Roy et al., Quantifying Taste Using 
a Hydrodynamic Oscillator, 31 INSTRUMENTATION SCI. & TECH. 425 (2003); Kiyoshi Toko, 
Taste Sensor, 64 SENSORS AND ACTUATORS B: CHEMICAL 205 (2000). 
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words, this proposal would not seek to replace incumbents as the 
executors of the process, but would remove so much discretion that 
incumbency incentives would become irrelevant. 
Converting the redistricting task to a procedure of mechanical 
implementation, however, is little different from feeding it to a literal 
machine. If discretion is drained from the primary redistricting body, 
all of the difficult negotiations to weight objectives and determine 
how conflicts among objectives should be resolved in different 
portions of the jurisdiction will just be pushed forward into the rules 
that the body applies. And if objectives or instructions are articulated 
with sufficient specificity to remove all ambiguity—for in any 
ambiguity there lies decision-making discretion—there is a 
substantial risk that the articulable set of proxies for a multifaceted 
particular theory of representation fails to accomplish the intended 
objectives as well as would be the case if decision makers were 
permitted to tweak around the edges. 
Consider, for example, an approach to representation that 
generally favored districts comprising individuals living close to 
each other, but also attempted to avoid districts fragmenting the 
voting power of otherwise cohesive populations with discrete 
political interests. If it were possible to come to global agreement on 
which objective should prevail, and to what degree, in the event of a 
conflict (which would require hard choices about “how close” and 
“how cohesive,” among others), it might be possible to devise a set 
of strict, discretion-free rules to approximately accomplish the goal. 
But even so, in any local geographic area, a slight deviation from the 
given general rules might better accomplish both aims. The more 
objectives there are, the more likely that the global mechanical 
implementing rules have local exceptions that all would prefer. 
Reducing discretion to a bare minimum is quite likely to yield 
undesired, unintended consequences. 27 
C.  Redistricting Contests 
Another suggested alternative to incumbent-driven redistricting 
was proposed recently in Ohio: a redistricting “contest.” This 
competition would have offered any member of the public the 
opportunity to draw and submit a map to be scored based on 
 
 27. See Huefner, supra note 5, at 52–53. 
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compliance with several prearranged criteria. The winning map 
would have been adopted as the official governing plan. 28 
Superficially, such proposals seem to have the virtue of 
transparency lacking in a plan simply spit out by a computer or 
implemented in a mechanical fashion by incumbents: everyone is 
able to see every map submitted and can assess each plan’s score. 
Yet in truth, this sort of contest setup essentially duplicates the 
automation notion in both of the ideas above and is subject to the 
same principal objections. 
For example, any objective scoring protocol will recreate the 
measurability concerns above: some standards will reflect the 
particular goal sought with far more precision than others, and that 
fact alone may drive greater prioritization of the more precise 
measures than is otherwise warranted. Moreover, the compilation of 
the scoring process itself reflects precisely the same choices 
necessary to program the Magical Redistricting Machine: if the 
scoring process rewards some choices and does not reward others, 
that score reflects a decision by some body of individuals about what 
should or should not be considered more important in the 
redistricting process. As with the machine, the decision process is 
simply moved to the stage of determining the scoring formula. There 
still remains the question of who makes that decision. 
This is not to say that contests have no redeeming features. As I 
have written elsewhere, if the population shares a commitment to 
certain representational goals, contests that encourage members of 
the public to submit plans fulfilling those goals in different ways 
provide transparent means to flesh out policy options. 29 If proxies for 
measuring those goals can be found with some relative precision, 
then individuals can be encouraged to one-up each other en route to a 
range of solutions more closely approaching a Pareto-optimal 
decision set. 30 And if there is a commitment to establish a pool of 
“winners,” rather than a single winning plan, that flexibility may 
 
 28. H.R.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010). 
 29. See Justin Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: A Big Step Forward, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE BLOG (June 24, 2009), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/ 
drawing_the_lines_in_ohio_a_big_step_forward/; Justin Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: The 
Structure of the Competition, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE BLOG (June 22, 2009), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/drawing_the_lines_in_ohio_the_structure_of_the_co
mpetition [hereinafter Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: The Structure of Competition]. 
 30. See Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: The Structure of the Competition, supra note 29. 
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adequately accommodate inevitable imperfections in the proxies or 
weighting process necessary for scoring contest results. These are all 
significant caveats. And they do not resolve the lingering issue at the 
end of such a contest: how to determine which body should decide, 
among the pool of winners, which plan will govern district lines for 
the next decade. 
D.  Temporal Shift 
The approaches above attempt to resolve the potential for 
abused discretion in the redistricting process by removing the 
discretion. As shown, however, squeezing the discretionary latitude 
from those who execute a redistricting plan simply redirects the 
exercise of discretion to an earlier point in the process: important 
decisions must be made in order to fashion the inputs to a computer 
program, the rules strictly binding legislators, or the scoring system 
for a contest. Those who favor these solutions must still decide who 
decides. 
A different approach to the redistricting conflict might attempt 
to resolve the potential for abused discretion by retaining the 
discretion but removing the abuse. Professor Adam Cox has 
proposed one intriguing approach: retain districting authority by 
legislative actors but design the districts for a future date, using 
projected demographic estimates and deferring the implementation 
of the new map. 31 That is, legislators in 2011 would draw districts 
using, say, 2016 population projections, with the resulting districts to 
take effect in 2016. In theory, the projected data and deferred 
implementation would reduce incumbent legislators’ ability to self-
deal effectively. In designing one’s own optimal district, it is a 
relatively trivial matter to tailor the district lines to demographic and 
political trends of the moment; it may be more difficult to anticipate 
such trends with precision several years down the road. Moreover, 
beyond the general composition of a district’s population, 
incumbents would find it far more difficult to identify and target 
promising
 
 31. Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412, 412 (2006). 
 candidates who threaten a challenge years from now than 
it is to target challengers on the immediate horizon. 
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Cox also notes that the decreased capacity for self-dealing may 
accompany decreased motivation for self-dealing. 32 For example, the 
redistricting payoff may be less viscerally compelling when the 
rewards of implementation are somewhat deferred. In addition, 
legislators—particularly state legislators currently vested with 
redistricting authority—may have their sights on different political 
offices and may thus have less desire to run for office in five years 
from the particular districts they are drawing. 
Nevertheless, though Cox’s temporal veil may usefully reduce 
incumbents’ incentive and capacity for self-dealing, it does not 
eliminate either. Deferring implementation for more than a few years 
renders demographic projections little more than guesswork and 
undermines the ability to adjust district lines in a way that reflects 
real population changes—which is, after all, the original rationale for 
redistricting. And deferring for only a few years still allows savvy 
incumbents to further personal or partisan interests at the expense of 
the public interest, albeit with a blunted tool. This is particularly true 
with respect to redistricting aimed not at improving one’s own 
fortunes but at worsening the opposition’s lot. Even when designing 
districts for the future, it is not difficult to fragment an opposing 
legislator’s existing constituents or pair two existing incumbents in 
the same district, for no reason other than to impact the opposing 
incumbents’ political fortunes. 
E.  Nonpartisan Bodies 
Another proposed version of a system intended to retain 
discretion but remove abuse would assign the redistricting process to 
an existing nonpartisan body of experienced technocrats. 33 This 
 
 32. Id. at 420–21. 
 33. Many believe that Iowa’s redistricting process fits this model. In truth, the structure in 
Iowa is substantially more complex. In Iowa, the body at the center of the process is the 
Legislative Services Agency (LSA), a body of civil servants committed to nonpartisanship and 
charged with, inter alia, legal and fiscal analysis of state legislation and state government 
oversight. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1 (2010). The LSA prepares draft redistricting plans under 
criteria set almost entirely by statute; where the statutory criteria leave discretionary latitude, the 
LSA looks for guidance to a five-person citizens’ commission appointed by the legislative 
leadership and charged with holding hearings to seek public input. Id. §§ 42.4–.6. When the first 
set of plans is presented, the legislature may accept or reject them without modification; if they 
are rejected, the LSA will prepare another set using the legislature’s feedback. Id. § 42.3. Those 
plans may also be accepted or rejected without modification; if they are rejected, the LSA will 
prepare a third and final set of plans, which may be modified at the legislature’s discretion. Id. 
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neutral body would be given several broad objectives and would 
create priorities and resolve conflicts as it saw fit. 
The technocratic solution is familiar but, in this context, flawed. 
First, this approach assumes that neutral nonpartisan stewards could 
be identified and that they would retain their nonpartisanship 
throughout the redistricting enterprise—an assumption that many 
question. 34 Second, even if Platonic nonpartisan stewards could be 
found, technocratic decision procedures are most appropriate when 
there exists widespread consensus about the goals of the process in 
question and few thorny redistributive tangles, and when the primary 
difficulty is in the application of these agreed-upon principles. 35In 
redistricting, this latter criterion is likely met, if at all, only in the 
abstract. All else equal, there is likely little disagreement that 
districts should optimally be of roughly equal size; reflect legitimate 
cohesive communities, including communities of racial and ethnic 
minorities; maximize the representation that voters perceive they 
have; establish fair partisan opportunity; reflect geographic areas that 
are relatively close together; track existing political boundaries; and 
provide meaningful choices in primary and general elections. 36 Dig 
deeper, and disagreement soon emerges within any general category 
about the more specific aim: as just one example, in considering 
districts of roughly equal size, analysts take notably different 
approaches to tolerance for population disparity 37 and the 
 
  That is, Iowa’s process is in many ways only structurally nonpartisan in the most 
ministerial aspects of the redistricting exercise. Overall policy choices have been made by the 
legislature, discretion within those choices is informed by the decisions of a partisan-selected 
independent citizen body, and the outcome is subject to substantial legislative review. 
  Historically, this structure has been applied in a manner revealing substantial legislative 
self-restraint that may well be unique to Iowa’s political culture. For example, although the Iowa 
legislature has the ability under this scheme to reject three LSA plans and then entirely substitute 
its own, it has thus far not chosen to do so. Furthermore, the entire procedure described above is 
statutory and subject to repeal or revision by the legislature at any time. Again, since the 
procedure’s inception in 1980, the legislature has left the structure in place. 
 34. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 24, at 674–76. 
 35. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1211–16 
(2008). 
 36. LEVITT, supra note 17, at 44. 
 37. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON ELECTION LAW, A PROPOSED 
NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO EMANCIPATE REDISTRICTING FROM 
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS 9, app. at C-1-3, app. at D (2007), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/redistricting_report03071.pdf. 
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composition of the population base. 38 Prioritizing among these aims 
when they conflict—indeed, several of these goals necessarily 
conflict—is the subject of vigorous and widespread disagreement 
among those who analyze or participate in the redistricting process, 
and the choice of priorities has serious redistributive consequences. 
Here, the political aspect of redistricting is most prominent. A body 
to resolve these political battles must have not only decision-making 
power but also, given the contested nature of the choices, decision-
making legitimacy. 39 
F.  Citizens’ Commissions 
Thus, we arrive at a final alternative to legislative control of the 
redistricting apparatus: citizens’ redistricting bodies. This approach 
attempts to address both the concern with self-interest and the need 
for a legitimate but flexible decision-making structure. It does so by 
assigning the redistricting pen to a set of potentially partisan citizens 
not directly beholden to incumbent elected officials. 40 Given the 
pragmatic concerns with separately electing such a citizens’ 
redistricting body, 41 analysts have attempted to devise other means 
by which citizen redistricters might be chosen with sufficient 
legitimacy to validate the political choices inherent in the 
redistricting exercise. 
1.  Legitimacy and Diversity 
Some such proposals would rely on a random selection of 
citizens registered to vote, much like a jury. In theory, such a 
selection has the potential to mirror the relevant cleavages in the 
jurisdiction as a whole. This ability to reflect the jurisdiction’s 
composition is, in turn, important in lending legitimacy to the body’s 
deliberations since the pre-political choices it makes will determine 
the nature of the political representation that the jurisdiction receives, 
at least until the next redistricting. 42 
 
 38. See Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773–76 (9th Cir. 1990); id. at 778–88 
(Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
 39. See Kang, supra note 20, at 688–89. 
 40. LEVITT, supra note 17, at 22, 73. 
 41. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 42. See infra note 49. 
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In practice, however, truly random selection is unlikely to 
produce any individual single redistricting body that looks much like 
the jurisdiction to be redistricted. Selecting a large number of 
individuals at random from a broader pool will likely yield a 
representative sample. But redistricting bodies must be relatively 
small, in order to ensure their ability to deliberate effectively. And 
the random choice of just a few members from a larger pool creates 
the substantial potential for a redistricting body that looks little like 
the jurisdiction as a whole. Accounting for the time and technical 
capacity required of redistricting bodies further reduces the pool of 
available individuals—and the likelihood that a random pool of 
qualified and available redistricters would be representative. 
Particularly for large and diverse states like California, choosing a 
small number of available individuals at random is far more likely, in 
any given draw, to yield a group that does not reflect the population 
of the state as a whole than to yield a group that happens to do so. 
In the jury system, there are arguments for accepting the 
capacity of a single random draw to produce a nonrepresentative 
petit jury panel; many of these arguments find solace in the 
aggregate diversity of juries produced by random draw. 43 
Redistricting, however, takes place in most areas only once every ten 
years. This yields a remarkably small set of redistricting entities with 
which to achieve diversity approximating the population as a whole 
solely through repetition of a random draw. 
Moreover, the jury system attempts to compensate for individual 
nonrepresentative jury panels with tools designed for a different 
measure of legitimacy: the degree to which the direct participants in 
the system, the litigants, perceive the jury panel as fair. Each side is 
given the opportunity to use voir dire and peremptory strikes to 
increase the perceived fairness—or, at least, to decrease the 
perceived unfairness—of any given jury panel with respect to the 
 
 43. These arguments include practical difficulties in assembling a representative petit jury, 
see Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the 
Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 142–44 (1996), and a normative commitment to the various 
benefits of second-order diversity over the benefits of more representative individual panels. See 
Heather Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005). In practice, 
commentators note that exemptions from jury service may skew the composition not only of the 
petit jury but also of the jury pool itself, perhaps reducing the solace provided by the presumption 
that jury draws, in the aggregate, reproduce the diversity of the total population. See, e.g., JON M. 
VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO 
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 272–80 (1977). 
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panel’s ability to deliberate on that side’s own interests. 44 Similar 
procedures to promote legitimacy are thornier in the redistricting 
context. Jury-based litigation is designed to distill disputes to a single 
decisional axis (e.g., results favoring the defendant more than the 
plaintiff, or vice versa); the two primary adversarial stakeholders on 
this axis are the parties using strikes to shape the fairness of the jury. 
In contrast, redistricting decisions have many potential axes (e.g., 
political, racial, regional) and many direct stakeholders whose 
interests may not be aligned. Even if it were possible to mitigate the 
legitimacy gap of a randomly selected but unrepresentative 
redistricting panel through procedures analogous to a jury-selection 
strike, it is not clear who should be granted the power to wield such 
strike authority. 
Perhaps for these reasons, when citizens’ redistricting panels 
have actually been convened in American jurisdictions, the 
procedures for populating the panels have involved either significant 
modifications of—or complete departures from—the random-draw 
jury model. 45 In 2010, six states each placed primary responsibility 
for drawing state district lines in the hands of a citizens’ group not 
beholden to particular elected officials; all but Alaska did the same 
for congressional district lines. 46 
These six states’ redistricting bodies follow two primary models. 
California has opted for the approach most like jury selection, albeit 
with important modifications. A panel of independent state auditors 
reviews would-be volunteers for California’s commission in a 
process much like voir dire, screening applicants for conflicts of 
 
 44. Scholars vigorously dispute the degree to which peremptory strikes actually increase the 
fair composition of a jury panel. See, e.g., Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious 
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005). To the extent that this 
tool does not increase the perceived legitimacy of the petit jury, that deficiency merely highlights 
the need to seek alternative selection procedures for a fair redistricting body. 
 45. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHO DRAWS THE LINES (2009), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/redistricting/ 
20100908.Redistricting.04WhoDrawstheLines.pdf (reviewing the selection mechanisms for 
states’ independent commissions). 
 46. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §§ 3–4, 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; CAL. CONST. 
art. XXI, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); WASH. CONST. art. II, 
§ 43; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8251–53.6 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1502 (2006); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-101, 102, 105 (2010); WASH. REV. §§ 44.05.030–.100 (2005). Several 
local jurisdictions also rely on citizen redistricting bodies not beholden to particular legislative 
officials. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 50–52. 
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interest and technical qualifications. 47 In addition to asking this panel 
to gauge commissioner capacity, California explicitly requests that 
the panel of auditors assemble its “venire” with partisan balance and 
“appreciation for California’s diverse demographics and 
geography.” 48 This “venire” is then subject to several peremptory 
strikes by the majority and minority party leadership from each of 
the two legislative chambers. From the remaining pool, eight 
commissioners are selected at random from subpools divided by 
partisanship, to ensure partisan balance even as the individuals are 
randomly selected. Those eight then select six additional 
commissioners, again from partisan subpools to preserve partisan 
balance; as with the “venire,” the law expressly states that this choice 
is to be exercised in a manner such that the final commission reflects 
the racial, ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity of the state. 49 
With careful attention to partisanship and demographic diversity at 
each stage, California’s selection procedures depart from the jury 
model in an attempt to foster representative diversity in the particular 
body convened to perform redistricting. 50 
 
 47. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2), (d). 
 48. Id. § 8252(d). 
 49. Id. § 8252(g). Like most other states with a citizens’ redistricting body, California has a 
commission that aims for partisan balance (equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats, plus 
additional members from neither party) rather than a partisan composition that mirrors the 
partisan makeup of the state. By contrast, in evaluating other demographic criteria, California 
asks that its commission reflect the diversity of the state, rather than numerical balance. As a 
consequence, partisanship is the only characteristic that is protected structurally on the 
commission, such that a majority will not be able to impose its preferences on a dissenting 
minority. 
  In part, this distinction may represent an assessment that substantive criteria to be 
applied by the redistricting body—like the Voting Rights Act—adequately protect other interests 
in the redistricting process. But the distinction may also reflect a presumption about the 
comparative strength of partisanship as a motivating factor in redistricting, even among 
individuals who are not themselves partisan elected officials. When partisanship is singled out as 
the lone trait requiring balance, it presumes that commissioners would allow their partisan 
allegiance to drive jurisdiction-wide redistricting decisions, to a greater extent than their 
allegiance to any other group. In a future work, I anticipate exploring this singular designation of 
partisanship as the lone trait with a built-in veto in the citizens’ redistricting context. 
 50. In this respect, California apparently hopes to derive legitimacy through the presumption 
that individuals with various demographic characteristics will represent shared concerns of 
communities with similar characteristics, even if not selected specifically by those 
communities—a function known as “descriptive representation.” See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, 
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60–63 (1967). Scholars have noted the tendency of this 
descriptive representation to provide legitimacy in political institutions, see, e.g., Michael 
Rabinder James, Descriptive Representation in the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, in 
DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY 107–09 
(Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., 2008), though the comparative merits of descriptive 
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The other states with citizens’ redistricting bodies employ a 
different approach, turning away from the jury model entirely and 
relying more heavily on derivative legitimacy gleaned from senior 
elected officials. In all but Alaska, the legislative majority and 
minority leaders of each house each choose a citizen to form the core 
of the redistricting commission. 51 In Alaska, the two legislative 
majority leaders, the governor, and the state supreme court’s chief 
justice select the redistricting commissioners. 52 In the commissions 
of these five states, any legitimacy flows (as with any appointed 
office) from the appointing officials’ accountability. These officials, 
in turn, presumably face interest-group pressure to appoint 
commissioners responsive to the various organized voter blocs 
within the state. 53 
2.  Independence 
Despite legislative leaders’ role in the initial selection of 
commissioners for the states above, each such state has taken steps to 
ensure that the members of its citizens’ redistricting body are not 
structurally beholden either to legislative leadership or to other 
incumbents. So, for example, each of these states prohibits legislators 
or other public officials from themselves serving on redistricting 
commissions. 54 Each also prohibits commissioners from running for 
office in the districts that they draw, at least for a few years. 55 
 
representation as a means to further the interests of represented communities are hotly debated, 
and beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 51. In Arizona, Montana, and Washington, these four commissioners then select a 
tiebreaker, though Washington’s fifth member serves as the body’s chairperson but does not vote 
on substantive redistricting proposals. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. V, 
§ 14(2); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(2). In Idaho, the chairpersons of the two largest political 
parties in the state each select a commissioner to join the initial four, for a total of six members of 
the redistricting body. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 52. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8. 
 53. These bodies’ limited size (Alaska, Arizona, Montana, and Washington have five-person 
commissions; Idaho’s commission has six members) may make it difficult to find commissioners 
who adequately represent the various interest groups of the state. Moderately larger bodies may 
increase the capacity for broader representation without substantially sacrificing the efficacy of 
decision-making. 
 54. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(a); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. 
XXI, § 2(c)(6); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); WASH. CONST. art. 
II, § 43(3). 
 55. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(c); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(13); CAL. CONST. art. 
XXI, § 2(c)(6); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(6); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-105; WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 44.05.060(3) (2005). 
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Arizona and California further bar legislative staff from serving on 
their commissions. 56 
These restrictions are not intended to screen every informed 
political observer from participating in redistricting. Rather, they are 
designed to ensure that a citizens’ redistricting body does not become 
an exercise actually conducted by legislators with citizen stand-ins. 
Although legislative leaders with the ability to choose commissioners 
will certainly select like-minded citizens, including citizens with 
similar partisan objectives, if commissioners do not further depend 
on those who select them, there is little reason to believe that these 
commissioners will feel obligated to act as the leaders’ proxies in 
pursuing districts drawn to suit incumbents’ personal inclinations. 57 
3.  Potential Benefits 
Placing the redistricting power primarily in the hands of private 
citizens’ commissions has substantial upside potential in one primary 
respect: it may avoid the direct conflict of interest created by 
legislators’ personal stake in the redistricting outcome. Removing 
this conflict of interest is not the same as removing “politics” from 
the process or creating a “nonpartisan” decision structure. On the 
contrary, it is to be expected that a redistricting commission will 
engage in the substantially political task of reconciling competing 
values—and that in doing so, the commissioners will incorporate, 
among many other preferences and concerns, partisan aims either 
explicitly or sub silentio. The power of the partisan impulse, for 
example, may explain why partisan balance is built directly into the 
structure of the statewide citizen redistricting commissions 
implemented in practice. 58 Indeed, the decision to forego a 
“nonpartisan” procedure is an acknowledgment that, because 
virtually every redistricting decision has a predictable partisan 
 
 56. California, Idaho, and Washington also bar recent legislative lobbyists from serving on 
their redistricting commissions. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2005); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 72-1502 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.050(2) (2005). 
 57. Washington adds an intriguing role for the legislature once its citizens’ commission has 
drawn a map. The legislature may tweak the lines proposed by a citizens’ commission—but a 
two-thirds vote is required to do so, the changes may affect only 2 percent of the population in 
any given district, and the changes may not intentionally favor a particular party or group. WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 43(7); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.100(2) (2005). The extent to which such 
changes have, in the past, been deployed specifically to benefit particular incumbents is not clear. 
 58. See supra note 49. 
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impact, it is preferable to recognize and balance partisan preferences 
than to allow a predictable skew to take shape in an unintentional or 
underhanded fashion. 59 
Instead of striving for nonpartisanship or freedom from politics, 
the principal value of a citizens’ commission is its ability to remove, 
or blunt, purely personal interests that incumbent legislators are 
largely free to indulge. That is, citizens whose job security is not 
affected by the outcome of a redistricting process will feel far less 
compulsion to distort otherwise coherent districts in the service of 
punishing a competitor, ensuring access to a particular funder, or 
capturing a personally salient landmark or facility that has little to do 
with the remainder of the district’s representation. As a result, the 
process fosters not only improved procedural fairness, but also 
improved substantive fairness in the resulting districts. 
Crucially, this vision of improved substantive fairness is based 
only on the premise that districts drawn by an effective citizens’ 
commission will be drawn in a manner that does not allow the self-
interest of particular incumbents to dominate other legitimate values. 
This Essay does not claim that citizens’ commissions will always 
create districts that better achieve any other preferred substantive 
goal, independent of the jurisdiction’s political geography and its 
shared commitment to representational objectives. 60 For example, it 
may be that in a given jurisdiction, districts would be more balanced 
between Democrats and Republicans if incumbents did not draw 
them—but this is not the necessary result of a citizens’ redistricting 
process. The substantive outcome of any particular districting 
scheme depends on both the goals that those drawing the lines pursue 
and the political distribution of voters who live in the jurisdiction. 61 
 
 59. Even in Iowa, for example, where an agency whose nonpartisanship is rarely questioned 
is primarily responsible for the drafting of redistricting plans, that agency's role is—at least 
formally—largely administrative. The criteria that it applies are politically established. And 
where applying those criteria requires the exercise of discretion or decisions among competing 
value choices, the nonpartisan agency looks to a citizens’ commission of balanced partisan 
composition for guidance. See supra note 33. 
 60. Put differently, the choice of a citizens’ commission removes a barrier to representation 
in the public interest, but does not itself establish representation in the public interest. 
 61. This Essay therefore does not purport to confront recent studies examining whether 
citizens’ redistricting commissions have accomplished (or could theoretically accomplish) various 
substantive objectives, prominently including district competitiveness or legislator polarization. 
See, e.g., Jamie L. Carson & Michael H. Crespin, The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on 
Electoral Competition in United States House Races, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 455 (2004); David 
G. Oedel et al., Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional 
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What citizens’ commissions instead guarantee is the assurance that 
the overriding value that districts represent is not particular 
legislators’ self-interest. 
4.  Potential Detriments 
Even with the capacity to avoid incumbents’ self-interest, 
citizens’ redistricting commissions do not represent an unvarnished 
benefit. Placing the redistricting power primarily in the hands of 
private citizens’ commissions has potential downsides as well. While 
careful design may mitigate some of these limitations, and careful 
training others, it is important to recognize the potential downsides in 
order to avoid them. At least four such limitations are relevant here. 
First, any substitute for a legislative decision maker—
particularly when tasked with a process as fundamental as 
determining the representative structure for the community as a 
whole—risks a nontrivial challenge to its legitimacy. 62 That may be 
mitigated somewhat if the body is itself elected, although beyond the 
significant pragmatic difficulties with such an election, plurality 
election processes might well lead to a body that represents only a 
small portion of the jurisdiction to be redistricted. The legitimacy 
concern might also be mitigated if the citizens’ redistricting body is 
selected by trusted governmental officials or former governmental 
officials who may draw on their own representative legitimacy. And 
even with an unobjectionable selection process, the redistricting 
body will draw legitimate objections that the people’s will has not 
been represented in the redistricting process if the citizen 
commissioners do not substantially reflect the diversity of the 
 
Partisanship?, 54 VILL. L. REV. 57 (2009); Anthony E. Chavez, The Red and Blue Golden State: 
Why California’s Proposition 11 Will Not Produce More Competitive Elections 58–75 (Aug. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=anthony_chavez. Substantive prioritization of these 
objectives is a choice independent of the use of a citizens’ commission, and without prioritizing 
these objectives, it is not clear why citizens’ commissions should more readily achieve them on 
average. Indeed, it may be that citizens’ commissions are structurally designed to improve 
competitiveness in only one primary respect: by limiting self-interest, they prevent incumbents 
from drawing districts specifically to exclude particular promising competitors. See Justin Levitt, 
Redistricting Reform, for the Right Reasons, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE BLOG (Nov. 12, 2009), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/redistricting_reform_for_the_right_reasons/ 
(discussing districts drawn to exclude particular challengers, in both primary and general 
elections). 
 62. See supra Part IV.F.1. 
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political community to be subdivided. 63 This diversity is difficult to 
achieve randomly. And even with careful attention, it will be easier 
to meet in some states than others. 64 
Second, a commission of citizens poorly trained in the 
redistricting process may fail to execute its task appropriately. The 
principal responsibility of a redistricting body—any redistricting 
body—is to apply various criteria reflecting principles of 
representation or their proxies: drawing districts with roughly equal 
population, in compliance with the Voting Rights Act, in ways that 
may, for example, reflect various communities, roughly follow 
political boundaries, or track areas that are more or less compact. 
The redistricting body will also have to resolve conflicts among 
those criteria when necessary, by deciding to apply criteria more or 
less flexibly, or with greater or lesser priority, sometimes with state 
statutes or case law as a guide. Some of these principles may be 
complex, requiring substantial collection of data and nuanced 
analysis of both that data and the applicable legal standards. A 
commission of citizens poorly trained for the task may fail to abide 
by legal mandates. 65 Alternatively, a commission of poorly trained 
citizens, or those who lack confidence in the task, may simply defer 
to staff for substantive judgments; if staff members are beholden to 
particular incumbent legislators, such deference would merely 
replicate the conflict of interest discussed extensively above. 66 
The third potential downside relates to the second: rather than 
creating legal error or exhibiting undue deference, a commission of 
citizens unfamiliar with the redistricting process may end up 
defaulting on difficult political judgments, prioritizing certain criteria 
for the wrong reasons. People often reveal general preferences for 
certainty over uncertainty, objectivity over subjectivity, and neatness 
 
 63. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 20, at 679–80 (describing objections to a 2005 California 
proposal built around three retired judges); see also NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION GROUP, INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS: REFORMING 
REDISTRICTING WITHOUT REVERSING PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 4 (2010), 
available at http://naacpldf.org/files/publications/IRC_Report.pdf. 
 64. For example, in a state with substantial diversity, it may be necessary to deploy a 
substantially larger redistricting body to have an opportunity to reflect the diversity of the 
jurisdiction itself. See supra note 53. 
 65. Poorly trained legislators, of course, may also fail to abide by legal mandates, but there 
is also a substantial likelihood that some legislators with experience in the redistricting process—
or experienced legislative staff—would be available to limit at least unintentional failure. 
 66. See supra Part III. 
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over complexity. These preferences may lead individuals with 
redistricting authority to prioritize criteria with straightforward 
mathematical or geometric consequences, even if those criteria are 
deemed less important than their more qualitative alternatives or 
seem counterproductive in terms of the representational philosophy 
they support. Commissioners may decide, for example, that it is 
legally or representationally preferable to draw districts reflecting 
communities of shared political interest than to draw districts tracing 
county lines; yet because it is straightforward to trace county lines 
and more complicated to discern communities of shared political 
interest, redistricting bodies may find themselves drawn to the 
former at the expense of the latter. These preferences are not 
absolute, nor are they unique to citizens who are not incumbent 
legislators. But it may be more difficult for citizen commissioners 
who are unaccustomed to the redistricting process to set these natural 
proclivities aside. 
The final detrimental potential of citizens’ redistricting bodies 
discussed in this Essay is that expectations for an independent, 
citizen-led process may be set too high, creating rather than reducing 
public disillusionment with the political process. To the extent that 
there is perceived political dysfunction—an empirical question with 
a series of answers more complex than commonly assumed—
changes to the redistricting system cannot possibly solve all of the 
perceived problems at once. Redistricting is but one element of a 
process of electing representatives, operating within particular voting 
systems and alongside campaign finance rules, ballot access 
provisions, electoral procedures, candidate-recruitment structures, 
term limits, general political trends, and a host of other factors 
contributing to the selection of particular individuals to represent the 
public. Those representatives then enter a legislative system with its 
own structures and procedures, and perhaps its own structural and 
procedural pathologies. If there are broader political ills impacting 
satisfaction with government, changes in redistricting procedures 
alone cannot possibly hope to correct them all. 
Indeed, expectations for changes in the redistricting process may 
be set too high even if they are set lower than wholesale political 
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reform. 67 Some redistricting objectives, for example, are 
fundamentally incompatible. Though it may be possible to draw 
districts around whole cohesive communities or draw districts with 
approximately the same number of Republicans and Democrats, it is 
extremely unlikely that any map-drawer could accomplish both goals 
in the same district, in districts throughout a state with California’s 
political geography. This incompatibility is inherent in the political 
task and would persist no matter what process were used to draw the 
lines. Selling redistricting process change as a utopia of harmonized 
objectives is selling a prelude to disappointment. 
None of these potential downsides need be fatal to a citizens’ 
redistricting project. Citizen redistricters can be chosen in a manner 
designed to reflect the diversity of the jurisdiction they will 
subdivide. 68 Citizen commissioners can be trained to understand 
legal and practical responsibilities and to exercise their human 
capacity for qualitative judgment and complex problem solving. And 
the benefits of a citizens’ redistricting process can be focused on its 
capacity for eliminating a serious, and often overriding, conflict of 
interest, rather than eliminating all of the political process’s 
perceived ills. All of these elements, however, require concerted 
attention to ensure that the potential of a citizens’ commission is 
more positive than negative. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay has discussed alternatives to legislative redistricting, 
including the substantial potential in allowing citizens who are not 
beholden to particular legislators to draw the lines. This includes 
potential upsides: though the process will still be political, in the 
sense that citizen redistricters will need to weigh and balance various 
 
 67. See supra text accompanying note 61 (noting the limited objectives that citizen 
redistricting commissions are designed to achieve). 
 68. California’s nascent citizens’ commission appears to be well on the way. Sixty members 
of the initial pool reflected the diversity of the state in a number of different respects. See 
California Citizens Redistricting Commission: Frequently Asked Questions, WE DRAW THE 
LINES, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/faq.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). Though the final 
fourteen members of the commission were selected from this pool in part through a random 
process, the commission ultimately empanelled also reflected the state’s diversity, albeit in some 
respects more than others. See California Citizens Redistricting Commission: Commissioner 
Biographies, WE DRAW THE LINES, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/bios.html (last visited Apr. 24, 
2011). Only time will reveal whether the commission is actually perceived to legitimately 
represent the redistricting priorities of the people of the state as a whole. 
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conflicting representational values, it is unlikely to be driven by 
particular politicians’ narrow interests in retaining their seats or 
punishing their opponents. And if the selection process is designed to 
foster balance and diversity, the resulting districts may well do a 
better job at representing the preferences of the whole than does the 
status quo. A citizens’ redistricting body also includes potential 
downsides: citizen redistricters who are new to the process may be 
drawn to easily maximized, quantitative criteria for where the lines 
should fall or rely excessively on staff with similar concerns, at the 
expense of more complex qualitative judgments that better reflect 
normative judgments about representation. Navigating these straits 
will be difficult, and the route traveled by California’s new citizens’ 
commission may prove an example—or a warning—about the 
potential of further similar enterprises around the country. 
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